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VOTER BEWARE: COLORADO’S BALLOT
INITIATIVES AND THE TAKING OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY UNDER THE U.S. CONSTITUTION
DANIEL FRANKLIN *
Brief Introduction
In 2013, two municipalities in Colorado enacted moratoria on the use of
hydraulic fracturing (“fracking”) 1—a technique that has been used for
decades to stimulate oil and gas production from new and existing oil and
gas wells. In addition to the fracking moratoria, various organizations and
interest groups proposed a number of ballot initiatives relating to local
regulation of oil and gas in 2014.
Colorado is one of a few states that allows its residents to amend the
state constitution by popular vote. In Colorado, if enough signatures are
collected in support of a ballot initiative, the initiative is placed on the
ballot and submitted to a vote. 2 The oil and gas ballot initiatives proposed,
among other things, gave local government regulatory authority over oil
and gas operations in their jurisdictions and increased the statewide setback
requirements for new wells. If approved, these initiatives would have

* Daniel Franklin is a 2016 Graduate of the University of Oklahoma College of Law.
He currently works as a Landman for Anadarko Petroleum in Denver, Colorado.
1. See Colorado Supreme Court Considers Legality of Fracking Bans, Heartland Inst.
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://news.heartland.org/newspaper-article/2016/02/18/colorado-supremecourt-considers-legality-fracking-bans.
2. See Placing an Initiated Proposal on the Statewide Ballot, Colo. Legislative
Council, https://www.colorado.gov/pacific/cga-legislativecouncil/how-file (last visited June
28, 2016).
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amended the Colorado Constitution and seized regulatory authority from
the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission. 3
The minimum setback ballot initiatives required new wells to be drilled
anywhere from 1,500 feet to 2,640 feet from occupied structures,
representing a substantial increase from the current statewide 500-foot
setback requirement. 4 The “local control” initiatives permitted local
governments to enact more restrictive regulations on exploration and
production of oil and gas than those currently enforced by the State and
would likely result in outright bans on fracking. Both types of ballot
initiatives would negatively affect the oil and gas sector in Colorado—and
eliminating the use of fracking would eliminate virtually all economic oil
and gas development in the state.
In November of 2014, Governor John Hickenlooper and United States
Representative Jared Polis agreed to pull the ballot initiatives from the
November ballot in an attempt to create legislative compromise. 5 Polis—
who indicated the initiatives would resurface if he opposed the results of the
compromise—pulled his support of the initiatives in exchange for an oil
and gas task force. 6 The task force is responsible for minimizing the
conflicts that occur between concerned citizens and oil and gas companies
when oil and gas operations are in urban areas surrounding schools and
homes.
These ballot initiatives resurfaced in January of 2016. 7 The new ballot
initiatives provide for local regulation of oil and gas activity, an increase of
mandatory statewide setbacks to 2500 feet, and an outright ban on
fracking. 8 If these initiatives make the ballot and voters approve them, they
will diminish the value of privately owned mineral rights and mineral leases
held by oil and gas companies operating in the state. Voters should be
aware that such measures could give rise to claims by mineral rights owners
3. See id.
4. See Statement of Basis, Specific Statutory Authority, and Purpose New Rules and
Amendments to Current Rules of the Colorado Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, 2
CCR 404-1, Cause No. 1R, Docket No. 1211-RM-04 Setbacks (Retrieved from
https://cogcc.state.co.us/RR_HF2012/setbacks/FinalRules/Final_SetbackRulesStatementOfBasisAndPurpose.pdf).
5. See Mark Jaffe, Hickenlooper Compromise Keeps Oil and Gas Measures off
Colorado
Ballot,
Denver
Post
(Aug.
4,
2014),
http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_26274685/hickenlooper-polis-float-colorado-oilgas-local-control.
6. Id.
7. See
Colorado
2016
Ballot
Measures,
Ballotpedia,
https://ballotpedia.org/Colorado_2016_ballot_measures (last visited June 28, 2016).
8. Id.
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and oil and gas operators under the “takings clause” of the Fifth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Such claims could result in cities,
counties and the State being liable for billions of dollars in damages, and at
the very least, years of costly litigation.
Overview of the Takings Clause
The last clause of the Fifth Amendment—which applies to state
governments via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 9—
says, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.” 10 When either federal or state governments appropriate
private property for the benefit of the public, the takings clause requires
them to justly compensate property owners. There is no language in the
takings clause that excludes the clause from applying to oil and gas mineral
interest. On the contrary, “private property” is a broad concept and
undoubtedly covers mineral interests and other property rights in realty.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly acknowledged that it has not provided
clear-cut guidelines for determining when a taking occurs,11 so determining
whether government action amounts to a taking in violation of the Fifth
Amendment is often an uncertain process. The most rudimentary form of
taking occurs when the government physically intrudes upon or
permanently occupies private property for the benefit of the public. 12 But,
not all takings claims involve the physical seizing of private property.
Regulatory Takings: Total and Partial Economic Loss
Fracking bans and minimum setback requirements do not physically
deprive mineral rights owners or oil and gas companies of property. Rather,
the proposed ballot initiatives will severely limit the use of private property
under the guise of a public benefit. These initiatives, therefore, fall into a
second category of taking known as a “regulatory taking.”
Regulatory takings can occur in two ways. A Lucas taking occurs when
laws or regulations deny property owners of economically viable use of
property—rather than a physical taking of property. 13 Jurisprudence
9. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 160 (1980).
10. U.S. Const. amend. V.
11. See, eg., Connolly v. PBGC, 475 U.S. 211, 224 (1986); Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York
City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
12. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 427.
13. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992). See also Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
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suggests that regulations are not takings unless there is a substantial—
nearly complete—loss of economic value of the property. 14 Under Penn
Central, if a regulation places economic limitations on property but does
not eliminate all economically beneficial use, the regulation still may be a
taking. 15 This depends on a variety of factors, such as the extent to which
the regulation interferes with reasonable investment backed expectations.16
If a court finds that regulatory interference goes too far, the property owner
will be compensated. 17
Obviously, not all laws that reduce property value give rise to a taking.
The general rule is that property may be regulated to a certain extent, but if
the regulation goes too far—based on a factual inquiry—it will amount to a
taking. 18
Lucas Taking: Total Economic Loss
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, the Supreme Court
considered whether a law that resulted in complete diminution of David
Lucas’s property value resulted in a taking under the Fifth Amendment. In
the case, Lucas purchased two coastal lots in South Carolina. 19 Thereafter,
the South Carolina legislature enacted the Beachfront Management Act,
which prohibited Lucas from constructing any habitable structure on his
property. 20
Lucas filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas against
the South Carolina Coastal Council, the regulatory agency responsible for
implementing South Carolina’s coastal zoning laws.21 Lucas claimed that
the statute’s application to him was a Fifth Amendment taking, and that he
was therefore entitled to just compensation. 22 The trial court agreed with
Lucas because the statute rendered Lucas’s property interest “valueless”
and ordered the state to pay Lucas a substantial judgment. 23 The South
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the trial court, finding that the Beachfront

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See, e.g., Jafay v. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm’rs, 848 P.2d 892, 901 (Colo. 1993)(en banc).
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124-25.
Id. at 124.
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
Id.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006.
Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1009.
Id.
Id.
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Management Act’s objective of preventing public harm as a result of beach
erosion was within the nuisance exception to takings clause liability. 24
The Supreme Court expressly rejected the nuisance theory used by the
Supreme Court of South Carolina, stating that “it becomes self-evident
noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulatory
‘takings’—which require compensation—from regulatory deprivations that
do not require compensation.” 25 The Court further stated that “the
legislature's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for
departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be
compensated.” 26 The court ultimately solidified a rule requiring payment
for regulations that deny property owners all economically beneficial use of
their property for the benefit of the public 27 and remanded the case to the
South Carolina Supreme Court to determine whether the Beachfront
Management Act constituted a taking of Lucas’s property by completely
extinguishing Lucas’ ability to realize any beneficial economic use from the
property. 28
Colorado may be exposed to a Lucas claim if the public enacts the ballot
initiatives. The Supreme Court’s Lucas decision requires compensation
when a regulation deprives a property owner of all economically beneficial
use of his or her property. 29 If sued, the state would likely argue that no
Lucas taking has occurred since fracking bans do not impede a company’s
ability to drill conventional vertical wells on their leasehold. Any
diminution in value, therefore, is not a loss of all economically beneficial
use of the property as required by Lucas. Landowners, however, will argue
that outright fracking bans destroy all economic value of their mineral
rights because fracking is the only available method to recover oil and gas
in economic quantities. Oil and gas companies—who can only derive
economic gain from the production of oil and gas—might also argue that
fracking bans create a total loss of the economic value of their leases
because conventional drilling cannot produce hydrocarbons in paying
quantities. If these points prove true, a ban on fracking likely constitutes a
taking and it is a violation of the Fifth Amendment to disproportionately
burden a few private citizens—instead of the public as a whole—with the
cost of governmental action intended to benefit the public.

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 1009-10.
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
Id.
Id. at 1015-17.
Id. at 1031-32.
Id. at 1016.
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The State will likely counter this argument with the parcel-as-a-whole
rule. When evaluating the merits of a takings claim, courts generally do not
divide a parcel of land into separate distinct property rights to determine if a
property owner has been deprived of economical use of a particular piece or
segment of ownership. 30 Rather, when determining whether a government
action is a taking, courts focus on the extent of the interference with rights
in the parcel as a whole instead of viewing the individual property right
being limited. 31 A regulation that eliminates one “strand” in an entire
bundle of property rights may not be a taking if the owner can still put the
land to other economically beneficial uses.
For example, a mineral rights owner would face an obstacle in a takings
claim against a municipality that bans fracking. The city could argue that
the ban only affects one piece of the entire bundle of property rights—the
subsurface mineral rights. The surface owner retains its economically viable
use for housing or agriculture.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has expressed concern with the
logic of the parcel-as-a-whole rule. 32 Moreover, several courts have held
that mineral rights are distinct parcels for takings purposes if the mineral
owner acquired those rights separately from other property interests. 33 This
is usually the case in Colorado, where mineral rights in oil and gas are
typically “severed” and acquired separately from surface ownership.
In Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, Whitney Benefits and Peter
Kiewit Sons' Co. (“Whitney Benefits”) owned coal-bearing property in
Sheridan County, Wyoming. 34 In 1977, Congress enacted the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act (“SMCRA”), which Whitney Benefits
claimed amounted to a taking of their property35 because the SMCRA
prohibited surface coal mining on their property. 36
In the case, Whitney Benefits applied for a strip mining application with
the Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality, 37 which was

30. See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 497; See also, Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 13031.
31. Id.
32. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016-17, (Footnote 7).
33. State ex rel. Shelly Materials Inc., v. Clark Cnty. Bd. Of Commr’s., 115 Ohio St.3d
337, 344 (2007); See also Cane Tenn., Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 108 (Fed. Cl.
2002) (distinguishing severed coal rights from unsevered coal rights when performing a
regulatory takings analysis).
34. 752 F.2d 1554, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
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subsequently denied. 38 Whitney Benefits promptly filed suit in the United
States District Court for the District of Wyoming. 39 The principal issue in
the case was whether the Claims Court correctly concluded that SMCRA's
“prohibition of surface mining of alluvial valley floors was a taking of the
Whitney Benefits coal property.” 40
After several years of costly litigation, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit affirmed the lower court’s award of sixty
million dollars to the plaintiffs.41 The court of appeals held that the
prohibition of mining in a particular tract of land—where the only property
interest the plaintiff owned in the tract was the right to surface mining—
was a total taking because the regulation wholly destroyed the economic
value of the plaintiff’s property without just compensation.42
The aforementioned cases support “total takings” claims by mineral
rights owners and oil and gas companies if the proposed ballot initiatives
result in fracking bans or moratoria. Total takings claims based on
increased setback requirements may be more difficult. If setbacks are
increased it will still be possible to drill in some cases, even though the
number of wells on the mineral leasehold may be significantly reduced.
Because it may still be possible to drill, the increased setback may not
effectuate a total taking of the economic value of a mineral interest or oil
and gas lease. Additionally, because of the parcel-as-a-whole rule, it may be
an uphill fight for landowners to prevail under the total takings analysis if
they own the entire parcel, including the un-severed mineral rights, because
increased setbacks would not affect their ability to utilize the parcel for
other economic ventures. But, in light of the Supreme Court’s contempt for
the parcel-as-a-whole rule and cases like Whitney Benefits that require just
compensation for regulations that destroy the economic value of mineral
estates, landowners and oil and gas operators have strong arguments for
Lucas claims.
Partial Regulatory Takings
If a claim is unsuccessful as a total taking under Lucas, mineral rights
owners and oil and gas companies may still have “partial” takings claims if
the regulation “goes too far.” Whether a partial taking has occurred depends
mostly on specific circumstances in a particular case. After Penn Central
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id. at 1156.
Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
See id. at 1178.
Id. at 1177.
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Transportation Company v. City of New York, courts generally balance the
economic impact of the regulation, the regulation’s interference with
investment-backed expectation, and the character of the governmental
action. 43
In Penn Central, the Court noted that Grand Central Terminal “is one of
New York City’s most famous buildings. Opened in 1913, it is regarded not
only as providing an ingenious engineering solution to the problems
presented by urban railroad stations, but also as a magnificent example of
the French beaux-arts style.” 44 In 1967, the New York City Landmarks
Preservation Commission, after a public hearing on the issue, designated
the terminal as a landmark. 45 This meant that any alterations to the
building’s exterior or architectural features would require Commission
approval. 46
In 1968, in an effort to generate supplemental income, Penn Central
entered into a fifty-year lease and sub-lease agreement for the construction
of either a fifty-five-story office building above the terminal or a fiftythree-story office building that would require some alterations to the
terminal. 47 Both parties agreed that the building would meet all zoning and
safety requirements not connected with historic preservation.48 Despite this
fact, the Commission elected to preserve the terminal and its landmark
status and rejected Penn Central’s application on the grounds that both
plans were an “aesthetic joke.” 49
Penn Central filed suit in the Supreme Court of New York arguing that
the Landmarks Preservation Law as applied to them appropriated their
property without “just compensation in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments.” 50 The New York Supreme Court agreed and granted
declaratory and injunctive relief to Penn Central. 51 On appeal, the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, reversed. 52 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari and considered three factors when
determining whether the governmental action constituted a taking: (1) the
economic impact of the regulation; (2) the regulation’s interference with

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 115.
See id. at 117.
Id. at 116-17.
Id. at 115-18.
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 117-18.
Id. at 119.
Id.
Id.
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investment-backed expectation; (3) and the character of the governmental
action. 53 The Court ultimately concluded that the application of New York
City’s Landmark Preservation Laws had not effectuated a taking of private
property because in equipoise, the character of the governmental action—
promotion of the general welfare and promoting reasonable beneficial use
of the landmark—outweighed the interference with investment-backed
expectation and the economic impact of the law. 54
The Penn Central factors are vague and often lead to an ad hoc factual
inquiry. It is clear, however, that a decrease in property value, by itself,
generally is not enough to amount to a taking. 55 But, oil and gas operators
and mineral rights owners can make strong arguments that the initiatives
constitute takings.
Mineral rights owners can claim that bans and moratoria on fracking and
radical increases in statewide setbacks destroy the investment expectations
in their property. Oil and gas operators—who have spent billions
purchasing mineral leases and building infrastructure expecting to earn a
return on their investment—would find that the number of wells they can
drill is greatly reduced. When courts consider the loss of investment
expectation in conjunction with the decrease in value of the mineral estates
as a result of the increased setbacks, it seems clear that the proposed
regulation constitutes a taking.
Conclusion
When a court decides that government action amounts to a taking, the
court declares that the general public, rather than a single citizen or small
group of citizens, should bear the burden of an exercise of governmental
power intended to benefit the public. No set formula exists for weighing
these private and public interests. If Colorado voters approve the proposed
ballot initiatives on fracking or increased setbacks, mineral rights owners
and oil and gas companies operating in the State will have legitimate
federal constitutional claims requiring compensation for the taking of their
property. Voters should be aware that if those claims are successful, the
resulting billions of dollars in damages could bankrupt local governments
and the State.

53. Id. at 124.
54. See id. at 138.
55. Animas Valley Sand & Gravel v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs., 38 P.3d 59, 65 (Colo.
2001).
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But, in addition to the cost of the lawsuit and the potential liability for
state and local governments, voters should consider the economic impact
and budgetary problems that these initiatives may cause.
A statewide fracking ban would prove damaging to the
Colorado economy, setting the state back an average of 68,000
jobs in the first five years and $8 billion in GDP. Over the long
term (2015-2040), the impact of a ban would result in average
93,000 fewer jobs and $12 billion in lower GDP when compared
to a baseline scenario. 56
The resulting reduction in GDP and taxable income will likely exacerbate
Colorado’s burgeoning budgetary deficit.
The anti-fracking and increased setback initiatives offer little (if any)
benefit to Coloradans and are fiscally irresponsible. When voters set aside
the political factors surrounding these ballot initiatives, it is clear that these
initiatives will fiscally harm Colorado if passed—even if state and local
governments were to escape takings liability. The only way for state and
local governments to win this zero sum game is to not play. Voter beware.

56. Richard Wobbekind & Brian Lewandowski, Hydraulic Fracturing Ban: The
Economic Impact of a Statewide Fracking Ban in Colorado, at 17 (Cindy DiPersio ed.,
2014).
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